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THE ARKANSAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS*
Susan Webber Wright**
Following is Chapter III of a multichapter short treatise on the
Arkansas law of oil and gas. Other Chapters appear in Volumes 9 and
10 of the UALR Law Journal.*** This treatise is not intended as an
in-depth analysis, but rather as a description of the current state law
which, the author hopes, will be helpful to those not regularly engaged
in the oil and gas law practice.
CHAPTER III
CONVEYANCES OF OIL AND GAS INTERESTS BY DEED
This chapter concerns transfers of oil and gas interests by deed.
First, interpretation problems are addressed, including the Strohacker
Doctrine by which Arkansas courts determine what is meant by a grant
or reservation of "minerals." Next is a discussion of decisions on the
Duhig Rule in Arkansas. Following are discussions of several construc-
tion problems, including whether a deed conveys a mineral or a royalty
interest, and the intended duration of a royalty interest conveyed. Fi-
nally, this chapter focuses on issues arising from a form of royalty deed
commonly found in Arkansas.
As noted in Chapter I, the owner of a severed mineral interest has
an implied right of reasonable use of the surface for the purpose of
developing the minerals. This right is apparently the same as the right
of a mineral lessee to reasonable use of the surface.' The nature and
extent of this right, as well as liability for unreasonable surface use, is
treated in Chapter IV on leases.
* All rights reserved by author. Material is subject to author's copyright.
Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law. The author ac-
knowledges and thanks Paula Williams, class of 1987, who helped in the research for this project.
*** Chapters I and II concern the Nature of Oil and Gas Interests and Multiple Ownership
of Oil and Gas Interests. Wright, The Arkansas Law of Oil and Gas, 9 UALR L.J. 223 (1986-
87).
1. Cases on reasonable use of the surface make no distinction between the right of a mineral
owner and the right of a mineral lessee. Some cases involve litigation between the mineral owner
and his lessee. See, e.g., Martin v. Dale, 180 Ark. 321, 21 S.W.2d 428 (1929).
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The Definition of "Minerals" - the "Strohacker" Doctrine2
The Arkansas courts, both state and federal, have on numerous
occasions addressed the meaning of the term "minerals" in a grant or
reservation. The rule followed is generally known as the Strohacker
Doctrine, named for the case of Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v.
Strohacker,s in which the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed a chan-
cery court decision that reservations of "coal and mineral deposits" in
1892 and 1893 deeds did not reserve the oil and gas. The court cited
the "contemporaneous construction" rule enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States," and held that the
intention of the grantor should be ascertained by reference to "sub-
stances commonly recognized as minerals"' 5  at the time of the
conveyance.
Application of the Strohacker Doctrine is a tedious and litigious
process, for it treats the meaning of "minerals" as a question of fact to
be determined on a case-by-case basis.6 It is a title examiner's
nightmare.7 Although the doctrine requires the finder of fact to give
effect to the intent of the parties to the conveyance, the issue is not the
parties' subjective intent. In 1958 in Stegall v. Bughs8 the Arkansas Su-
preme Court specifically rejected the contention that the subjective in-
tent of the grantor should be given effect:
We think that the meaning which this court has heretofore and should
hereafter give to the word "mineral," in connection with its use in
situations similar to those of this case, is governed not by what the
2. Gerald L. DeLung wrote an excellent analysis of the development of the doctrine. De-
Lung, The Strohacker Doctrine-An Arkansas Rule of Property, 9 ARK. LAW. 85 (July 1975),
reprinted in Proc., 14th Ann. Ark. Oil & Gas Inst. (1975). This section borrows heavily from the
material in that article.
3. 202 Ark. 645, 152 S.W.2d 557 (1941).
4. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
5. Strohacker, 202 Ark. at 656, 152 S.W.2d at 563.
6. In Brizzolara v. Powell, 214 Ark. 870, 218 S.W.2d 728 (1949), the Arkansas Supreme
Court reversed and remanded a lower court decision that a reservation of minerals did not include
oil and gas. The court pointed out that the question is one of fact.
7. Gerald DeLung has good suggestions concerning steps an attorney seeking a valid oil and
gas lease should take in consideration of the Strohacker Doctrine. He suggests leasing from all
persons claiming oil and gas under "problem tracts" and, if a claimant refuses to lease, using the
receivership procedures available under Arkansas statutes. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-201 to -
213.2 (1971) (for lands owned in cotenancy) and §§ 53-401 to -409 (1971 & Supp. 1985) (for
leasing of lands prior to partition). If it is necessary to make a reasoned guess concerning oil and
gas ownership, he suggests gathering as much information as is available concerning oil and gas
development in that county and surrounding counties so that one can determine the time when the
meaning of "minerals" would include oil and gas. See DeLung, supra note 2.
8. 228 Ark. 632, 310 S.W.2d 251 (1958).
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grantor meant or might have meant, but by the general legal or com-
mercial usage of the word at the time and place of its usage.9
In 1966 the Arkansas Supreme Court again explained the doctrine in
the case of Ahne v. Reinhart & Donovan Co.:'0 "Furthermore, the in-
tent of the parties will be determined so as to be consistent with and
limited to those minerals commonly known and recognized by legal or
commercial usage in the area where the instrument was executed."',
As a result of Strohacker, the Arkansas decisions have held that
the word "minerals" includes gas in a 1905 conveyance in Logan
County12 and in a 1934 conveyance in Pope County, 3 but excludes oil
in 1892 and 1894 deeds in Miller County 4 and in a 1900 deed in
Union County. 5 Application of the doctrine is not limited to oil and
gas. For example, cases have held that bauxite was not included in a
mineral reservation in Saline County in 1892,8 that pulaskite (a form
of granite) was not included in a 1953 mineral reservation in Pulaski
County,17 but that novaculite was included in a 1940 reservation in
Garland County.' 8
Aside from the difficulty of ascertaining what substances were
generally considered "minerals" at the time and place of a conveyance,
Strohacker might invite a court to consider evidence of other deeds in
determining the intent of the parties, as a federal district court did in
1965 in Middleton v. Western Coal and Mining Co.'9 In Middleton,
which was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,2" the dis-
trict court (Judge Miller) found that a 1904 deed in Sebastian County
to "the coal, fireclay and other minerals" did not include oil and gas,
although the court specifically recognized that "the business commu-
9. Id. at 634, 310 S.W.2d at 253. A later federal court decision recognized that subjective
intent is not the appropriate test for determining the meaning of "minerals." Thomas v. Markham
& Brown, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 498 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
10. 240 Ark. 691, 401 S.W.2d 565 (1966).
II. Id. at 696, 401 S.W.2d at 569.
12. Id. at 691, 401 S.W.2d at 565. The exact words of the grant were "all of the coal, oil and
mineral." Id. at 691, 401 S.W.2d at 566.
13. Singleton v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 205 F. Supp. 113 (E.D. Ark. 1962).
14. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Furqueron, 210 Ark. 460, 196 S.W.2d 588 (1946). This case is
almost indistinguishable from Strohacker on the facts. The railroad urged the court to overrule
the Strohacker Doctrine.
15. Stegall v. Bugh, 228 Ark. 632, 310 S.W.2d 251 (1958).
16. Carson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 212 Ark. 963, 209 S.W.2d 97 (1948).
17. Thomas v. Markham & Brown, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 498 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
18. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Meyer, 85 F. Supp. 157 (W.D. Ark. 1949).
19. 241 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Ark. 1965).
20. Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Middleton, 362 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1966).
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nity recognized oil and gas as a valuable mineral."" The court looked
to contemporaneous transfers of oil and gas in Sebastian County and
pointed out that in these deeds the parties had specifically referred to
"oil and gas." Thus, the court concluded that the parties to the deed
did not intend to include oil and gas in a deed to "coal, fireclay and
other minerals. ' 2 This decision and the Eighth Circuit's affirmance
have been criticized as erroneous and inconsistent with the Strohacker
Doctrine."'
It is correct to refer to the Strohacker Doctrine as a rule of law. 4
The Arkansas Supreme Court has refused to take other approaches in
determining the meaning of the word "minerals." A simple approach,
advocated by the late Justice McFaddin, would be to include oil as a
mineral in any deed after the year 1900.2 Another method is ejusdem
generis, which would include as a mineral any substance of the same
genus or class as those minerals specifically mentioned.
The Texas Supreme Court applied yet another method in deter-
mining the meaning of "minerals" in Acker v. Guinn. However, the
Acker approach has little application to oil and gas because it concerns
those minerals that must be mined in such a way as to destroy the
surface. This approach considers whether the parties intended for the
mineral owner to destroy the surface in developing the minerals. If
nothing in the deed suggests an intent to grant this right, the court will
not construe the deed as conveying the mineral. The Acker decision
cited the Arkansas decision in Carson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad
Co.,28 which determined under the Strohacker Doctrine that bauxite
was not a "mineral" in Saline County in 1892. The court in Carson
also noted that the mining of bauxite generally destroys the surface,
and concluded that the parties to the conveyance probably did not in-
21. Middleton, 241 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Ark. 1965).
22. Id. at 423.
23. See DeLung, supra note 2, at 89.
24. Id.
25. Stegall v. Bugh, 228 Ark. 632, 636, 310 S.W.2d 251, 254 (1958) (McFaddin, J.,
dissenting).
26. This approach is discussed in Note, Real Property-Scope of the Term "Minerals" in a
Mineral Deed, 4 ARK. L. REV. 249 (1950).
27. 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971). In Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99
(Tex. 1984), the Texas Supreme Court adopted a new approach, to be applied prospectively only,
in determining the meaning of "minerals." The court held that "other minerals" includes "all
substances within the ordinary and natural meaning of that word, whether their presence or value
is known at the time of severance." Id. at 102. If the mineral in question was not specifically
conveyed and if its mining results in surface destruction, the owner of the mineral estate must pay
compensation to the owner of the surface for surface destruction. Id. at 103.
28. 212 Ark. 963, 209 S.W.2d 97 (1948).
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tend for the surface to be destroyed by mining. 9 In a 1980 decision,
Southern Title Insurance Co. v. Oiler,"0 the Arkansas Supreme Court
mentioned that limestone mining generally destroys the surface of the
land, and held that the limestone was not generally known or regarded
as a mineral in 1909, when chalk deposits were reserved, or in 1975,




The Duhig Rule received its name from the Texas decision in
Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co.,3 1 in which the grantor conveyed a
tract of land by warranty deed, reserving a one-half mineral interest.
The deed thus purported to convey the surface and a one-half mineral
interest to the grantee. However, at the time of the conveyance the
grantor only owned a one-half mineral interest, because a third party
held an outstanding one-half mineral interest which the deed did not
mention. Both the grantor and the grantee admitted that the third
party had a one-half interest in the minerals, but each claimed owner-
ship of the other one-half. The court held for the grantee.
The result in Duhig can be reached in more than one way, and the
court itself was divided concerning the proper reasoning. Commissioner
Smedley, the author of the opinion, took the position that the reserva-
tion of one-half of the minerals in the grantor should be interpreted as
referring to the interest that was held by the third party. Thus, the
deed granted and warranted to the grantee what the grantor had to
convey: the surface and one-half of the minerals. Commissioner Smed-
ley pointed out that the language of the deed did not clearly indicate
that the grantor intended to reserve a one-half interest in addition to
the one-half that the third party already held.32 This reasoning has
been called the "one-step" approach to the Duhig Rule."
Commissioner Smedley wrote that the majority of the Duhig court
reached the same result by "application of a well settled principle of
estoppel." 4 According to this reasoning, the warranty in the deed ex-
29. Id. at 967, 209 S.W.2d at 99.
30. 268 Ark. 300, 595 S.W.2d 681 (1980).
31. 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940).
32. Id. at 506-07, 144 S.W.2d at 879-80.
33. See I H. WILLIAMS AND C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 311 at 580.29 (1985).
34. 135 Tex. at 507, 144 S.W.2d at 880.
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tended to the surface and to one-half of the minerals, while the deed
actually granted only the surface to the grantee, as the grantor re-
served one-half of the minerals and the other one-half was owned by a
third party. Using the analogy of the doctrine of after-acquired title,
the grantor was estopped to deny that he conveyed what he warranted.
This reasoning has been criticized as a "two-step theory of deed appli-
cation" unique to the Duhig Rule and otherwise unknown in rules gov-
erning construction of deeds. 5
Some jurisdictions have adopted Commissioner Smedley's ap-
proach, while others appear to follow the approach of the majority of
the Duhig court by relying on estoppel and the breach of warranty. 6
b. Cases rejecting Duhig
Although most jurisdictions deciding the issue have adopted the
Duhig Rule there have been some strong dissents37 and a few cases
have rejected the rule altogether.3 s From a possibly over simplified
analysis of the cases, three principal reasons for rejection of the Duhig
Rule become evident: 1) the grantee knew that the grantor owned less
than the entire interest; 2) a quitclaim deed was the instrument of con-
veyance; and 3) the Duhig rule converts a breach of warranty into a
grant.
1. Knowledge of the grantee
Some courts have rejected the Duhig Rule if the grantee knew at
the time of the conveyance that the grantor owned less than all of the
35. Ellis, Rethinking the "Duhig" Doctrine, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 947, 951 (1983).
36. See I H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 33, § 311, at 580.29 n.4 for cases relying
on the "one-step" reasoning, which include Garraway v. Bryant, 224 Miss. 459, 80 So. 2d 59
(1955); and Murphy v. Athans, 265 P.2d 461 (Okla. 1953). See I H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS,
supra note 33, at 580.31 n.6 for decisions that appear to follow the "two-step" reasoning, includ-
ing Lucas v. Thompson, 240 Miss. 767, 128 So. 2d 874 (1961); McClung v. Lawrence, 430
S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1968); and Body v. McDonald, 79 Wyo. 371, 334 P.2d 513 (1959). See I H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 33, at 580.29 n.3 for cases that contain both approaches,
including Brown v. Kirk, 127 Colo. 453, 257 P.2d 1045 (1953); Birmingham v. McCoy, 358 P.2d
824 (Okla. 1960); and Coyne v. Butler, 396 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
37. E.g., Salmen Brick & Lumber Co. v. Williams, 210 Miss. 560, 573-77, 50 So. 2d 130,
135-37 (1951) (Alexander, J., dissenting).
38. E.g., Gilbertson v. Charlson, 301 N.W.2d 144 (N.D. 1981); Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d
653 (Utah 1979). Both cases rejected Duhig because of the subjective knowledge of the grantee
that the grantor, at the time of the conveyance, owned less than all of the minerals. Later, in
Sibert v. Kubas, 357 N.W.2d 495, 498 (N.D. 1984), the North Dakota Supreme Court indicated
that the question of the grantee's subjective knowledge in Gilbertson was only dictum.
[Vol. 9:467
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minerals. In Hartman v. Potter,3 9 for example, the Utah Supreme
Court did not apply Duhig because at the time of the conveyance the
grantee knew that the grantor had only a one-half interest in the min-
erals.40 Similarly, the North Dakota Supreme Court refused to apply
Duhig in Gilbertson v. Charlson4 1 because the grantee, who was a co-
tenant in the property with the grantors, knew the extent of the grant-
ors' interests. However, in 1984 in Sibert v. Kubas4" the North Dakota
Supreme Court distinguished Gilbertson and held that the actual or
constructive knowledge of the grantee does not perclude application of
Duhig."
The Duhig decision did not discuss whether the grantee had
knowledge that the grantor owned only an undivided mineral interest.
Such knowledge is not relevant in a suit for breach of warranty" and
was considered immaterial in a decision which followed the Duhig
Rule, Body v. McDonald,46 decided by the Supreme Court in Wyoming
in 1959. As pointed out in Body, the grantees in such situations proba-
bly have knowledge of the extent of their grantors' interests through
title examinations.4 6 Even if the grantee does not have actual knowl-
edge, in most cases he would have constructive knowledge because the
outstanding interest would be in his chain of title."'
Probably the best approach in determining whether the grantee's
knowledge is a factor is to ascertain whether the goal is to obtain an
objective or a subjective construction of the deed. In a suit between the
immediate parties to the conveyance or their lessees, it might be appro-
priate to treat the question as one of subjective construction, deter-
mined by the actual intent of the parties as in a suit for reformation.
But if the suit is not between the immediate parties or their lessees,
rules of objective construction should prevail in order to protect the
expectations of bona fide purchasers and to ensure marketability of
titles.
39. 596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979).
40. Ellis, supra note 35, at 961, called this a case of "subjective construction" that neither
affirms nor rejects Duhig because the latter is a rule of objective construction.
41. 301 N.W.2d 144 (N.D. 1981).
42. 357 N.W.2d 495 (N.D. 1984).
43. Id. at 498. The Court distinguished Gilbertson on grounds that the grantee owned, prior
to the conveyance, an undivided interest in the property. Id. at 497.
44. E.g., Thackston v. Farm Bureau Lumber Corp., 212 Ark. 47, 204 S.W.2d 897 (1947).
45. 79 Wyo. 371, 334 P.2d 513 (1959).
46. Id. at 383, 334 P.2d at 517. This author is uncertain that parties generally have such
actual notice. See I H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 33, § 311, at 580.41-.42.
47. See I H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 33, § 311, at 580.36-.37 on the effect of
actual or constructive notice upon the Duhig problem.
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In an article cited extensively by the Arkansas Supreme Court in a
case applying the Duhig Rule, Professor Ellis pointed out that the
finder of fact should never attempt to combine the subjective and objec-
tive construction.48 If the goal is to apply a subjective construction,
then the court should look to the grantee's knowledge as well as to
other outside circumstances, and should not even consider the Duhig
Rule.4  But if the goal is to apply an objective rule of construction,
Duhig is the proper approach because it offers a predictable result that
protects bona fide purchasers and ensures marketable mineral titles.
Thus, in cases requiring rules of objective construction because the liti-
gants are not the immediate parties to the deed, the court in applying
Duhig should not consider whether the grantee had actual knowledge
that the grantor owned less than all of the minerals.5
0
2. Quitclaim deeds
The second reason for rejection of the Duhig Rule is that it should
not apply to quitclaim deeds, as the doctrine of estoppel by deed applies
only to estop a grantor of a warranty deed.5 1 This is true if the "two-
step" approach is followed, for that theory relies upon estoppel as a
result of the covenant of warranty. However, there is no reason to re-
ject Duhig under the "one-step" approach when there is a quitclaim
deed, as this approach does not rely upon estoppel but merely upon a
rule of construction of the deed: the reservation refers to the fractional
interest outstanding in a third party. Of course, when the fractional
interest owned by the third party is, for example, one-half and the res-
ervation is one-fourth, this approach cannot logically apply because the
fraction reserved and the fraction in the third party are different, and
the reservation cannot be said to refer to the interest in the third party.
Therefore, the Duhig Rule might apply to a quitclaim deed under the
"one-step" approach if the reservation is construed as referring to the
interest owned by the third party. However, as noted below, the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court has rejected this argument.
5 2
48. Ellis, supra note 35, at 956.
49. Id. See also I H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 33, § 311, at 580.41.
50. In support of this position, see I H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 33, § 311.
51. See 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 33, § 311.1, at 583-84 (citing, inter alia,
Hill v. Gilliam, 284 Ark. 383, 682 S.W.2d 737 (1985) (Duhig not applicable to a quitclaim)).
This is true if a covenant is necessary for estoppel, but learned opinion is divided on this. Williams
and Meyers prefer estoppel of the grantor if the grantee has paid valuable consideration, without
regard to the existence of a covenant of warranty.
52. Hill v. Gilliam, 284 Ark. 383, 682 S.W.2d 737 (1985).
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3. Grant Created from Warranty
A third reason for rejection of the Duhig Rule is that application
of the Rule creates a grant out of a covenant of warranty. If the gran-
tor owns only a one-half interest because there is a one-half interest
outstanding in a third party, and if the grantor purports to convey one-
half and reserve one-half in the same deed, it follows that he has
breached his warranty if the reservation is given effect. Some oppo-
nents of the Duhig Rule contend that the reservation should be given
effect and the grantee be allowed to pursue his cause of action for
breach of warranty. The dissent in Salmen Brick & Lumber Co. v.
Williams5a took this position and was cited by the dissent in the 1985
decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court in Peterson v. Simpson,54
which is discussed at length below.
Arkansas Cases on the "Duhig" Rule
Two recent Arkansas cases concern the Duhig Rule. The first, Hill
v. Gilliam,55 was decided in 1985 and held that the Rule does not apply
to a quitclaim deed. The second, Peterson v. Simpson,50 was also de-
cided in 1985 and applied the Rule to a warranty deed in a situation in
which the parties were not the parties to the deed in question.
In Hill, Phillips owned the surface and one-half of the minerals in
a tract; Long owned the other one-half mineral interest. Phillips con-
veyed to Grimes a one-fourth nonparticipating mineral interest in 1937.
Later in the same year Phillips conveyed to Gilliam an undivided one-
half interest in the property. The parties agreed that at this point Gil-
liam owned an undivided one-half interest in the surface and an undi-
vided one-half interest in the minerals (subject to the one-fourth non-
participating mineral interest held by Grimes). In 1947 Gilliam and his
wife executed a quitclaim deed back to Phillips, reserving an undivided
one-half interest in the minerals. The heirs of Phillips brought suit
against the heirs of Gilliam to quiet title, alleging that the reservation
in the quitclaim deed was ineffective because of the Duhig Rule.
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor on grounds
that the Duhig Rule does not apply to quitclaim deeds.5 7 Justice New-
53. 210 Miss. 560, 573-77, 50 So. 2d 130, 135-37 (1951).
54. 286 Ark. 177, 183, 690 S.W.2d 720, 724 (1985).
55. 284 Ark. 383, 682 S.W.2d 787 (1985).
56. 286 Ark. 177, 690 S.W.2d 720 (1985). These cases are the topic of Note, 8 UALR L.J.
267 (1985-86).
57. 284 Ark. at 387, 682 S.W.2d at 739. The court cited Rosenbaum v. McCaskey, 386 So.
2d 387 (Miss. 1980) as authority for the proposition that the Duhig Rule does not apply to quit-
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bern, writing for the court, rejected the Phillips heirs' argument that
Duhig can apply to a quitclaim deed under the "one-step" approach,
noting that three decisions from other jurisdictions adopting the "one-
step" reasoning had each involved a warranty deed in which the reser-
vation was construed as an exception to the warranty to insulate the
grantor from a suit for breach of warranty.5"
The opinion in Hill seems to give effect to the subjective intent of
the parties, as Justice Newbern wrote that "[wie look to the deed and
the context in which it was made to ascertain the intent of the par-
ties."5 9 Justice Newbern pointed out that because Phillips, who had
previously owned the surface and one-half of the minerals to the tract,
knew of the extent of Gilliam's interest, it was unlikely that the reser-
vation by Gilliam was intended to give Phillips notice of the outstand-
ing one-half interest in Long. Therefore, the court reasoned that Gil-
liam must have intended, by the reservation, to keep a one-half interest
in himself.60
The result in Hill is probably sound, but the court could have
reached the same result by reasoning that Duhig is a rule of objective
construction, which is not to be applied to any deed-warranty or quit-
claim-where the issue is one of the parties' subjective intent. The par-
ties in this case were heirs of the original parties to the deed, not bona
fide purchasers protected by the recording system. Therefore, the court
could have rejected Duhig's application without resorting to a rejection
of it to all quitclaim deeds.61
In Peterson v. Simpson6 2 Bullock conveyed a tract to Baird, re-
serving one-half of the minerals. The parties agreed that Bullock was
the owner of one-half of the minerals. In 1941 Baird conveyed his in-
terest to Payne, and in 1947 Payne conveyed his interest to Pope. In
1948 Pope, the owner of the surface and one-half of the minerals, con-
veyed by warranty deed to Andrews, with the following reservation:
"Reserving however, from this conveyance, for the grantors herein,
their heirs and assigns forever, ONE-HALF (1/2) of all oil, gas, coal
claim deeds.
58. 284 Ark. at 387, 682 S.W.2d at 739. The three decisions are: Brown v. Kirk, 127 Colo.
453, 257 P.2d 1045 (1953); Garraway v. Bryant, 224 Miss. 459, 80 So. 2d 59 (1955); and Mur-
phy v. Athans, 265 P.2d 461 (Okla. 1953).
59. 284 Ark. at 387, 682 S.W.2d at 739.
60. Id. at 388, 682 S.W.2d at 739.
61. The appellants (the heirs of Phillips) were apparently correct that the "one-step" ap-
proach to Duhig could apply to quitclaim as well as to warranty deeds. See supra text accompany-
ing note 51.
62. 286 Ark. 177, 690 S.W.2d 720 (1985).
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and other minerals, in and to and that might be produced from the said
real estate." ' The Simpsons obtained their interest through a series of
conveyances beginning with Andrews. The Petersons were the succes-
sors in interest to Pope. Each claimed to own one-half of the minerals.
Justice Dudley wrote for the majority and held for the Simpsons
on grounds that the Duhig Rule should apply as an objective rule of
construction. Citing the article by Professor Ellis,6 Justice Dudley rea-
soned that the issue was not one of the subjective intent of the grantor
and grantee, who were not the parties to the suit. Instead, the suit was
between the successors in interest to the original parties, and the over-
riding consideration should be protection of bona fide purchasers and
marketability of land titles:
Subsequent purchasers, or grantees, must be able to rely upon this
interpretation or else, under these types of circumstances, every title
would require a lawsuit in order to be alienable. Rejection of the
Duhig Rule would mean sacrificing the degree of certainty and guid-
ance that it can provide concerning marketability of mineral interests,
and replacing it with an outbreak of lawsuits. This we are not willing
to do.6
The majority opinion pointed out that it is not necessary to adopt
the "two-step" reasoning of the Duhig case in order to reach the same
result.66 Justice Dudley quoted the Ellis article67 to the effect that the
Duhig Rule is composed of two sub-rules:
1. A warranty deed which does not limit the interest in the minerals
granted purports to grant 100% of the minerals. (The "100% rule.")
2. If the grantor of a warranty deed does not own enough interest to
fill both the grant and the reservation, the grant must be filled first.
(The "allocation of shortage rule.") 6"
The majority opinion in Peterson indicated that in a suit for reforma-
tion between the original parties, a court may consider subjective in-
tent.6 9 Such consideration would properly include actual knowledge of
the grantee concerning the extent of the grantor's interest.
Thus, the Arkansas Supreme Court has not adopted either the
"one-step" or the "two-step" approach to the Duhig Rule. Literal ap-
63. Id. at 180, 690 S.W.2d at 723.
64. Ellis, supra note 35.
65. 286 Ark. at 181, 690 S.W.2d at 723.
66. Id. at 179, 690 S.W.2d at 722.
67. Ellis, supra note 35, at 947.
68. 286 Ark. at 179, 690 S.W.2d at 722.
69. Id. at 181, 690 S.W.2d at 723.
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plication of the latter approach, which is based upon an analogy to the
doctrine of after-acquired title, would require a court to consider the
actual knowledge of the grantee to be immaterial, even in a suit be-
tween the immediate parties to the conveyance. The Supreme Court of
Wyoming has so held.70 Instead, a majority of the Arkansas Supreme
Court seems to have adopted Duhig as an objective rule of construction
to be applied when the suit is not between the immediate parties to the
deed.
Justice Newbern, who wrote the opinion of the court in Hill v.
Gilliam7 1 wrote the dissent in Peterson.7 2 The dissenting opinion found
no ambiguity in the grantor's intent to reserve for himself a one-half
interest in the minerals, for the reservation was "for the grantors
herein, their heirs and assigns forever. ''7 3 Thus, a minority of the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court would look to the actual intent of the immediate
parties to the grant, which the majority refuses to do unless those par-
ties are also the parties to the suit.
The dissent also noted that successors in interest to the original
grantee had constructive notice of any outstanding mineral interest if
the deed creating that interest was recorded. If the deed was not re-
corded, the subsequent grantees would be bona fide purchasers, but the
dissent argued that the "Duhig rule has nothing to do with either situa-
tion. ' 74 Hence, the dissent claimed that the Duhig Rule does nothing to
protect the recording system. Again, this shows a fundamental disa-
greement with the majority, which viewed the Duhig Rule as eliminat-
ing the need for future litigation on deed construction by adoption of
an objective rule. The majority was not concerned that the grantee
might have constructive notice and therefore might not be a bona fide
purchaser.
Finally, the dissent quoted from the dissent in a Mississippi Su-
preme Court case, Salmen Brick & Lumber Co. v. Williams,7 5 to the
effect that a warranty should not constitute a conveyance.7 This argu-
ment seems persuasive, but actually the Duhig situation does involve a
conveyance of minerals as well as a warranty. 7  The issue is whether
70. Body v. McDonald, 79 Wyo. 371, 334 P.2d 513 (1959).
71. 284 Ark. 383, 682 S.W.2d 737 (1985).
72. 286 Ark. 177, 182, 690 S.W.2d 720, 724 (1985) (Newbern, J., dissenting. Chief Justice
Holt and Justice Hickman concurred in the dissent).
73. Id. at 183, 690 S.W.2d at 724.
74. Id.
75. 210 Miss. 560, 50 So. 2d 130 (1951).
76. 286 Ark. at 183, 690 S.W.2d at 724.
77. Admittedly, the Duhig problem arises from the grantor's failure to specify the quantum
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the conveyance will be given effect when there is also a reservation and
the quantum of minerals is not sufficient to satisfy both the grant and
the reservation.
As a result of Hill v. Gilliam and Peterson v. Simpson, title exam-
iners in Arkansas can assume that the Duhig Rule applies to warranty
deeds when the immediate parties to the deed are not the current inter-
ested parties. When the deed is a quitclaim deed, or when the parties to
the deed are the interested parties, the rule does not apply. Duhig, al-
though difficult to understand and justify, is probably a sound, predict-
able approach to a recurring problem in mineral titles.
Mineral or Royalty
Numerous cases from oil producing jurisdictions discuss the issue
of whether a deed conveys (or reserves) a mineral or a royalty inter-
est.78 As pointed out by Williams and Meyers in their treatise, the con-
sequences of an interest being mineral or royalty include the following:
1) The quantum of production to which the owner is entitled. 9
For example, the owner of a one-eighth mineral interest is entitled to
one sixty-fourth of the production if the lease reserves a one-eighth roy-
alty. On the other hand, the owner of a one-eighth royalty is entitled to
one-eighth of the production.
2) Participation in bonus and delay rentals.80 The owner of the
minerals is entitled to participate in bonus, which is the consideration
paid for the execution of the lease, and in delay rental payments, which
keep the lease in force during the primary term in absence of drilling
operations or production. The owner of a royalty interest is generally
not entitled to either of these payments.
3) Power to execute leases.81 The owner of minerals enjoys the
power of executing minerals leases, while the owner of a royalty inter-
est has no such power but has the right to receive part of the
production.
of minerals conveyed, which is presumed to be all the minerals other than the quantum reserved in
the instrument itself.
78. E.g., Little v. Mountain View Dairies, 35 Cal. 2d 232, 217 P.2d 416 (1950); Rogers v.
Morgan, 250 Miss. 9, 164 So. 2d 480 (1964); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Beach, 78 N.M. 634, 436 P.2d
107 (1968); Barker v. Levy, 507 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). For a thorough discussion of
the problem, see HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 2.7 (2d ed. 1983), most of which is
excerpted from Hemingway, The Mineral-Royalty Distinction in Oklahoma, 52 O.B.J. 2791
(Nov. 28, 1981).
79. 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 33, § 303.1.
80. Id. at § 303.2.
81. Id. at § 303.3.
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4) Power to explore and develop."2 The owner of minerals has this
power, while the owner of a royalty interest does not.
5) Partition.8 The owner of a mineral interest may partition in
some jurisdictions, including Arkansas. 84 However, a royalty interest is
not partitionable.
86
On occasion the Arkansas Supreme Court has been faced with the
mineral/royalty distinction.86 For example, in Keaton v. Murphy8 7 the
court held that a conveyance of "an undivided one-half interest of the
one-eighth royalty held by the Murphy Land Company in and to all
the oil and gas in, under and upon the [described] lands" conveyed
one-half of the royalty payable under the lease in effect at the time of
the deed. 88 The appellee contended that the deed conveyed an interest
in the minerals in place. The deed expressly stated that the grantees
were entitled to one-half of the royalty under an existing lease, and the
grantees to the deed testified that the intent was to convey a royalty
interest.8 9
The 1950 decision in Longino v. Machen90 held that the grantee
received royalty in an existing lease, not an interest in the minerals in
place, in a deed entitled "Sale of Royalty In Oil and Gas Lease." The
deed referred to "royalty" in the habendum clause and in the acknowl-
edgement. The ambiguous portion of the deed was the granting clause,
which referred to "a one-fourth undivided interest in all right, title and
interest retained by us, or in any manner whatsoever owned by us, in a
certain oil, gas and mineral lease .... "9 The successors in interest
to the grantees contended that this clause conveyed to them a one-
fourth interest in the grantor's reversionary interest in the minerals in
place. The court acknowledged the ambiguity, but pointed out that roy-
alty alone was created by the lease, and that had the parties wished to
convey an interest to the minerals in place, the grantor could have exe-
cuted an ordinary mineral deed. 92 This decision and the Keaton deci-
sion support construction of an ambiguous deed as conveying a royalty
82. Id. at § 303.4.
83. Id. at § 303.5.
84. See Chapter II, 9 UALR L.J. at 244-45.
85. E.g., Hudgins v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 144 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Tex. 1956).
86. In addition to the cases discussed herein, see Arkansas Valley Royalty Co. v. Arkansas-
Oklahoma Gas Co., 222 Ark. 213, 258 S.W.2d 51 (1953).
87. 198 Ark. 799, 131 S.W.2d 625 (1939).
88. Id. at 800 n.1, 131 S.W.2d at 626 n.l.
89. Id. at 801, 131 S.W.2d at 629.
90. 217 Ark. 641, 232 S.W.2d 826 (1950).
91. Id. at 642, 232 S.W.2d at 826.
92. Id. at 644, 232 S.W.2d at 827.
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interest if the property was subject to a lease at the time of the deed.
In Wynn v. Sklar & Phillips Oil Co.9 the deed in question was
entitled "Royalty Deed" and conveyed the following interest in the
granting clause:
a one eight [sic] (being all the Royalty retained by us) undivided in-
terest of, in and to all the oil, gas and minerals on, in and under the
. . . lands . . . granting to the said J. M. Talley, his heirs and as-
signs, the right of ingress to and upon said lands for the purposes of
securing, storing and removing oil and gas, and the right of occupancy
of said lands for and only for the purposes of storing, securing and
removing oil and gas.
94
The lower court found that this clause conveyed a one-eighth in-
terest in the minerals in place, but the appellant contended that it con-
veyed the right to receive one-eighth of the minerals produced, or a
royalty interest only. The ambiguity stemmed from inclusion of the
words in parentheses. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court on grounds that the words "in and under" generally refer to min-
erals in place, that a preference should be given a specific provision
over a general one in an ambiguous instrument, and that the subse-
quent conduct of the grantor indicated that he believed that he had
conveyed a one-eighth interest in the minerals, not a royalty interest.
The court pointed out that although the grantor had executed a lease to
the property about two years prior to this conveyance, there was no
evidence in the record that the lease was still in effect,95 and that it was
unlikely that the parties intended to convey only a royalty interest in an
unproductive lease.96 The opinion correctly noted that in some circum-
stances the parties to a conveyance have considered a royalty interest to
be the equivalent of a one-eighth mineral interest.
97
Duration of Royalty and the Rule Against Perpetuities
At times the question arises whether a royalty is perpetual or
whether it terminates with the lease in existence at the time of the
conveyance of the royalty. The holding in Keaton v. Murphy,9 8 dis-
93. 254 Ark. 332, 493 S.W.2d 439 (1973).
94. Id. at 335, 493 S.W.2d at 441.
95. Id. at 342 n.3, 493 S.W.2d at 445 n.3. The court noted authority from Oklahoma to the
effect that the issue of the meaning of the word "royalty" may depend upon the existence of a
lease at the time of the conveyance. Elliott v. Berry, 206 Okla. 594, 245 P.2d 726 (1952).
96. 254 Ark. at 342, 493 S.W.2d at 445.
97. Id. at 348, 493 S.W.2d at 449.
98. 198 Ark. 799, 131 S.W.2d at 625 (1939).
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cussed above, was cited as controlling in McWilliams v. Standard Oil
Co.9 9 McWilliams leased to Newblock, then conveyed by warranty
deed to Jameson, and included the following reservation: "It is ex-
pressly agreed and stipulated that a one-half undivided interest in and
to the royalty retained by grantor in oil and gas lease heretofore exe-
cuted covering aforesaid land, is hereby reserved by grantor herein."' 00
After the Newblock lease had terminated, the widow and heirs of
Jameson executed a lease that was assigned to the defendant, Standard
Oil Company. The court held that the royalty retained by McWilliams
expired with the Newblock lease.
In Hanson v. Ware'01 the Arkansas Supreme Court found that a
perpetual royalty, as opposed to a royalty that terminates with a partic-
ular lease, was conveyed in a grant of a one-sixteenth interest in "all
the oil and gas produced and saved" by the current lessee or by "any
one lese [sic] who may operate for oil and gas from any of the premises
aforesaid" which included both leased and unleased tracts.'
An additional, and probably more significant holding in Hanson
was that a perpetual royalty does not violate the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities, as it represents a present interest in real property.0 3 Rejecting
contrary decisions from Kansas and California,'0 4 Justice George Rose
Smith, who wrote the opinion of the court, pointed out that interests
subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities involve an uncertainty whether
the owner of a contingent interest or some third person will acquire
absolute ownership. Such is not the case of the owner of a perpetual
royalty, who owns the interest absolutely because there is no third
party who might acquire ownership. The uncertainty of the perpetual
royalty owner is "the possibility that there may in fact be no oil and
gas within the land."' 05 This holding is correct and well-reasoned, be-
cause a royalty interest in Arkansas is recognized as an interest in real
property, although minerals are personal property once they are sev-
ered from the surface.
08
99. 205 Ark. 625, 628-31, 170 S.W.2d 367, 368-69 (1943).
100. Id. at 630, 170 S.W.2d at 369.
101. 224 Ark. 430, 274 S.W.2d 359 (1955).
102. Id. at 432-33, 274 S.W.2d at 360-61.
103. Id. at 436, 274 S.W.2d at 362.
104. Id. at 434-35, 274 S.W.2d at 361-62.
105. Id. at 436, 274 S.W.2d at 362.
106. See Chapter I, 9 UALR L.J. at 226.
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Other Construction Problems in Arkansas Royalty Deeds
In the 1978 case of Barret v. Kuhn,1°7 the grantees in certain roy-
alty deeds claimed a right to share not only in the standard one-eighth
royalty reserved in leases executed by the owner of the executive right,
but also in overriding royalty payments reserved in the leases. Each
grantee received an interest through a conveyance entitled "Royalty
Deed," and the word "non-participating" was beneath the title. 108 The
granting clause gave the grantee, subject to conditions and reservations
in the instrument, "an undivided one sixty-fourth (1/64) interest in and
to all of the oil, gas and other minerals, in, under and upon the follow-
ing described lands ... , I'l The deed also provided (in what the
court called the royalty clause) that the grantors, who reserved the ex-
ecutive right, would not execute a lease for a royalty less than one-
eighth. " ' The deed further provided that the grantee would receive
"one-eighth of all oil and/or gas run to the credit of the royalty interest
reserved under and by virtue of any oil and gas mining lease
... ,"I Following the royalty clause was a production clause that
provided that "in any event the grantee herein, its successors or assigns,
shall be deemed the owner of and shall be entitled to receive one sixty-
fourth of all oil and gas produced and saved from said land or any part
thereof.
112
The owners of the executive right executed leases to the property
reserving the standard one-eighth royalty and an overriding royalty of
an additional one-sixteenth in some leases and an additional one-eighth
in others. The grantees under the royalty deed claimed that the royalty
clause entitled them to one-eighth of all royalty, including overriding
royalty. The owners of the executive interests, who were the grantors or
their successors in interest, claimed that the grantees were entitled only
to one-eighth of the standard one-eighth royalty. The court held that
the grantees were limited to one-eighth of one-eighth, as the granting
clause in the deed granted to them a one sixty-fourth interest in the
minerals, and if they were to receive one-eighth of the overriding roy-
alty as well as one-eighth of the standard one-eighth royalty, they
107. 264 Ark. 347, 572 S.W.2d 135 (1978).
108. A non-participating royalty does not share in delay rental or bonus payments and does
not share in the leasing or development rights. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS
TERMS 555 (6th ed. 1984).






would be receiving more than a one sixty-fourth interest.113 Further-
more, the court pointed out that the one sixty-fourth interest was speci-
fied in the production clause. " 4
The parties to the deed in Barret probably intended for the
grantee to take a one-eighth interest in the minerals and thereby be
entitled to a one sixty-fourth royalty from a standard lease reserving a
one-eighth royalty. Had the granting clause conveyed a one-eighth in-
terest in the minerals, the court might have found that the grantee was
entitled to share in the overriding royalty. In a similar case, Griffith v.
Taylor,"6 the Texas Supreme Court permitted the grantee to partici-
pate in "bonus" royalty reserved by the owner of the executive interest.
However, the Griffith decision is distinguishable because the granting
clause of the deed gave the grantee one-half of the minerals, so that the
grantee's participation in the royalty and the overriding royalty did not
result in his receiving a fractional royalty greater than the mineral in-
terest conveyed in the granting clause.
In 1983 the Arkansas Supreme Court decided another case involv-
ing a deed very similar to the one in Barret v. Kuhn. In Dow Chemical
Co. v. Warmack" 6 an instrument entitled "Royalty Deed" conveyed an
undivided fractional interest "in and to all of the oil, gas and other
minerals" in the tract." 7 After the property description, a typewritten
sentence was inserted as follows: "It is the intention of grantor herein
to convey, and grantor herein does hereby convey to grantee ten (10)
royalty acres, non-participating." 8 The printed portion of the deed re-
served in the grantor the right to lease oil and gas and the right to
receive delay rental and bonus payments from oil and gas leases. The
grantee subsequently tendered a lease of his undivided interest in the
salt water, or brine. The lessee refused the lease on the grounds that
the grantee had only a non-participating royalty, without the leasing
right. The court upheld the lower court's holding that the grantee had
the power to lease the brine, as the deed granted an undivided interest
in the minerals to the grantee, reserving the executive right to oil and
gas only. The court held that the typewritten sentence had reference to
a non-participating royalty in the oil and gas only." 9 Therefore, the
grantee was a mineral cotenant to minerals other than oil and gas.
113. Id. at 352, 572 S.W.2d at 137-38.
114. Id. at 352, 572 S.W.2d at 138.
115. 156 Tex. I, 291 S.W.2d 673 (1956), discussed in Note 35 TEx. L. REv. 459 (1957).
116. 281 Ark. 77, 661 S.W.2d 376 (1983).
117. Id. at 78, 661 S.W.2d at 376.
118. Id. at 78, 661 S.W.2d at 376-77.
119. Id. at 80, 661 S.W.2d at 377-78.
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The Arkansas Supreme Court indicated that the form of deed in-
terpreted in Barret v. Kuhn and Dow Chemical Co. v. Warmack has
been used for about fifty years in Arkansas. 120 Oliver Clegg, a noted oil
and gas practitioner, has pointed out several other questions presented
by this deed form which remain unanswered. 2 ' Such questions include
whether the grantor has the power to pool the nonexecutive interest of
the grantee and whether the grantee would be entitled to participate in
extra bonus or an oil payment reserved by the owner of the executive
interest. These issues relate directly to the duty, if any, owed by the
executive to the nonexecutive interest owners.
120. Id. at 78, 661 S.W.2d at 376. This deed form was the subject of a law review article
that pointed out errors commonly made by Arkansas lawyers using the form. Langford, Arkansas
Form of Royalty Deed for Oil and Gas Conveyances, 3 ARK. L. REV. 190 (1949).
121. Clegg, The Arkansas Royalty Deed: Answers and Questions, 21st Annual Arkansas
Natural Resources Law Institute (1982).
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